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We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research
stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The alloca-
tion of funds is subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments
linked to attaining the next benchmark, which must be increasing in the funding horizon of
each stage. Benchmarking reduces agency costs, directly by shortening the agent’s guaranteed
funding horizon, and indirectly via an implicit incentive eﬀect of information rents in future
ﬁnancing rounds.
The ex ante need to provide incentives and the venture capitalist’s desire to cut information
rents ex post create a hold-up conﬂict, which can be overcome by providing all funds in every
stage in a single up-front payment. Empirical patterns of the evolution of ﬁnancing rounds and
research intensity over the lifetime of a project are explained as optimal choices: the optimal
capital allocated and the funding horizon are increasing from one stage to the next. This
emphasizes the notion that early stages are the riskiest in an innovative venture.
Key words: venture ﬁnancing, optimal stopping, benchmarking, stage ﬁnancing, abandon-
ment option.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D83, D92, G24, G31.1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The venture capital industry, which has become the main source of ﬁnancing of innovative
projects, oﬀers unique insights into how ﬁnanciers and managers of innovative start-ups align
their interest and resolve agency conﬂicts. The most frequently cited agency problems in ven-
ture capital contracting are that entrepreneurs may invest into eﬀorts that have high personal
return (scientiﬁc recognition, investment in human capital, etc.) but add little or no value
to the venture, and the tendency of the entrepreneurs to continue their projects beyond the
eﬃcient stopping time. The importance of the latter problem has arguably been reaﬃrmed by
the slow and expensive wind-down of many cash-burning internet start-ups after March 2000.
Stage ﬁnancing stands out as “the most potent control mechanism a venture capitalist can
employ” (Gompers and Lerner (1999), p. 139). Venture capitalists do not commit to future
ﬁnancing rounds, but will only agree to future ﬁnancing rounds if their intermediate evaluation
of the project is positive. By staging their ﬁnancing, venture capitalists retain the real option
to abandon the project periodically. Often, explicit benchmarks - technological or ﬁnancial
in nature - are written into the contracts, giving the venture capitalists additional contingent
control rights that can be exercised if the benchmarks are missed, including the rights to change
the management of the venture or to initiate liquidation procedures. Typically, the estimated
cash need for the entire stage is injected at the beginning of the round, putting a large cash
reserve at the disposal of the ﬁrm that is gradually drawn down.
Empirical research has revealed that the precise use of staging instruments depends on
the risk and the characteristics of the project. The riskier is the project, the less information
venture capitalists have about the venture, or the larger is the discretion of the entrepreneurs1,
the shorter are the staging intervals, and hence the more frequently are venture capitalists
reevaluating the project and pondering the abandonment option. The larger is the total funding
received of a venture, the more ﬁnancing rounds are used. There is further empirical evidence
on typical patterns of stage ﬁnancing over the lifetime of a project. Typically, the duration of
stages are increasing from one stage to the next. Also, the amount of cash injected per round
is increasing over time. The rate of return seems to be highest in the early stages of a project,
both measured by the internal valuations estimated at the start of every ﬁnancing round, as
by market-based exit valuations.2 Practitioners apply considerably higher discount rates in
1Kaplan and Stromberg (2001)(2002), Gompers and Lerner (1999).
2See for these observations Cochrane (2001), Das et. al. (2002), Gompers and Lerner (1999), p. 139.
1early stages, reﬂecting a perceived higher failure risk there than in later stage investments.
While it has long been recognized in the literature that stage ﬁnancing is a tool to mitigate
agency conﬂicts, explicit dynamic studies on how projects are benchmarked, and how the opti-
mal staging policy interacts with the typical conﬂicts in the ﬁnancier-entrepreneur relationship,
are surprisingly rare. Agency considerations are, however, an important determinant of the
optimal funding policy of an innovative project. They inﬂuence the research intensity, research
lay-out and the research budget. This paper aims to provide a more detailed understanding of
this link by looking at the role of benchmarking.
We propose a simple model of a venture project over multiple stages to analyze this in-
teraction. The venture capitalist controls the investment opportunity but she needs a wealth
constrained entrepreneur to run it. The project consists of several stages, each characterized
by a benchmark, and the successful completion of the project requires that every benchmark
is met. Time and money needed to meet each benchmark are subject to uncertainty, since in
each period, the research eﬀort can either make progress or fail. As the project continues to
receive ﬁnancing without achieving the next benchmark, the investor gets closer to the point
where she wishes to abandon the entire project. When one of the benchmarks is attained, the
probability of the entire project jumps upwards.
The investment eﬀort is unobservable to the investor and the entrepreneur can divert the
funds to his private ends. The entrepreneur’s control of the fund allocation introduces a conﬂict
meant to capture in a stylized way the two main agency conﬂicts in the venture ﬁnancing cited
earlier, namely self-serving investments and the bias towards ineﬃcient continuation. In each
period, the solution of the agency conﬂict has to take into account the intertemporal incentives
for the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur diverts the capital ﬂow for private purposes, she knows
that she continues to receive funding for sure. In contrast, if she invests the funds, she knows
that with a certain probability she is successful and the funding in the current stage will end.
The longer the funding horizon of the current stage, the larger is this option value of the
diversion.
1.2. Results and empirical implications
We ﬁrst analyze the optimal funding when the venture capitalist cannot observe whether the
intermediate benchmarks have been attained. In this case, the venture capitalist can only
deﬁne a total funding horizon for the entire project, and make sure that the reward to the
entrepreneur in case of completion of the last benchmark provides suﬃcient incentives to invest.
2This solution is ineﬃcient compared with benchmarking for three reasons: ﬁrst, there is no
abandonment if the early benchmarks are not completed in time, adding to the entrepreneur’s
discretion and information rent. Second, if the early stages take longer than expected, the
remaining budget for the last stages is ineﬃciently small. Finally, since the venture capitalist
is in a position of asymmetric information with respect to the number of benchmarks that have
already been met, the incentive payments must be tailored to ﬁt several possible “types” of
the entrepreneur, which again increases the information rent.
We then consider the case where the benchmarks are observable. The optimal contract uses
stage ﬁnancing, the conclusion of a new contract upon reaching each benchmark. This oﬀers
the advantage of exploiting the value of the real option to abandon the project over time. The
necessary incentive payments are an increasing function of the entrepreneur’s discretion over
the funds, and thus of the funding horizon of each stage. It reduces agency costs, because the
agent’s guaranteed funding horizon is reduced by the introduction of intermediate benchmarks.
Agency costs are also reduced by the fact that the informal promise of information rents
in future ﬁnancing rounds acts as an implicit incentive device. A hold-up problem emerges
between the ex ante incentive potential of implicit contracts and the venture capitalist’s desire
to cut information rents ex post. The supply of excess cash to the venture, as implied by
providing all funds in a given stage in a lump-sum payment at the beginning of each stage, is
a commitment device to overcome this problem.
We ﬁnd that the optimal funding horizon is increasing from one stage to the next. This
eﬀect is exacerbated by the impact of the agency costs, and by the implicit incentive eﬀect
of future information rents. Thus, our model shows that the principal stylized facts of the
evolution of funding over time can be explained as optimal choices: the research intensity is
lower for early stages, explaining that a smaller budget is allocated to them, that their duration
is shorter, and their success probability smaller. This is turn explains why the research risk is
larger in early stages, and thus the observed return, conditional on success in early stages, is
larger.
1.3. Related Literature and Overview
W h i l et h ei m p o r t a n c eo fs t a g eﬁnancing has been widely documented in the empirical literature
on venture capital contracting,3 only a small number of theoretical papers have explicitly tried
3Kaplan and Stromberg (2001), (2002), Kaplan et al. (2002), Gompers and Lerner (1999), Cochrane (2001)
and Das et al. (2002).
3to provide a rationale for the use of benchmarks in venture ﬁnance. Cornelli and Yosha
(1999) analyze the problem of an entrepreneur manipulating short-term results for purposes
of “window-dressing”. Neher (1994) shows that stage ﬁnancing can serve as an instrument to
reduce the bargaining power of an opportunistic entrepreneur who can repudiate her ﬁnancial
obligations. Berk et al. (2000) distinguish between purely technical risk in early stages and
a diverse sources of risk in later stages. They show that the systematic risk component is
strongest in early stages, justifying a larger risk premium. Elitzur and Gavious (2001) have a
model with several stages, where the probability to attain each benchmark is determined by
the entrepreneur’s one shot eﬀort choice. In their setting, optimal incentives contracts give
rewards only upon completion the last stage, in contrast to our results.
The basic set-up of our model closely follows our earlier papers on venture funding and
the ﬁnancing of innovation (Bergemann and Hege (1998) and (2002)), where we studied the
dynamics of the optimal contract, the role of hard claims, the impact of time consistency on
the stopping decision, and distinguished between arm’s length and relationship ﬁnancing. The
innovation in this paper is the inclusion of intermediate benchmarks.
The agency problem in our paper is also related to papers emphasizing the role of hard
budget constraints in the funding of innovation, like Ambec and Poitevin (2001) and Qian and
Xu (1998). Finally, a large literature has investigated capital structure design, and in particular
the use of convertible securities, as a tool for the venture capitalist to force abandonment
of unproﬁtable projects, and thus as an alternative or complementary instrument to staged
ﬁnancing. Recent papers have frequently looked at two-sided moral hazard situations between
entrepreneur and venture capitalist, e.g. Casamatta (2000), Repullo and Suarez (2000) and
Schmidt (2002).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The single stage
project is reviewed in Section 3. The structure and eﬃciency of multi-stage projects without
benchmarking is examined in Section 4. We then consider stage ﬁnancing with benchmarking
in Section 5. Section 6 discusses possible extensions and concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a project with uncertain return that needs continuous ﬁnancing over several stages
and that can be undertaken by an entrepreneur or agent with zero wealth. The project is ﬁ-
nanced by a venture capitalist providing up the necessary funds. The entrepreneur and venture
capitalist are both risk-neutral and have a common discount rate r>0.W ei n t r o d u c eﬁrst the
4technological characteristics of stage ﬁnancing before turning to the contracting environment.
2.1. Project and Stages
The innovative project needs to go through N sequential stages, which we denote by n =
1,2...,N, to be successful. At the end of each stage, there is a discernible output, or benchmark.
This may be a ﬁrst research result, a key module, a prototype or a beta version, a product
ready for mass production, and ﬁnally the production, distribution and marketing facilities
necessary for the launch of operations. The stages are sequential in the sense that the successful
completion of the stage n − 1 is a technological prerequisite for entering into the stage n.
If the last stage is completed, the output is veriﬁable and a gain of R is realized. The value
of an incomplete project is zero (discussed in Section 6). We assume that it is worthwhile to
undertake the project for at least one period, R>c .
The uncertainty of the project is resolved over time by a discovery process.I ne v e r ys t a g e ,
experimentation is needed to preserve the chances that the benchmark is eventually met, and
experimentation requires time and money. If experimentation is undertaken in a given period
t, then the stage of the project is successfully completed with probability λ,a n dc o s t scλ to
undertake. Therefore, the probability of completion of each stage per period is either λ (if
there is investment), or 0 (if there is none). These conditions are the same for every stage.
The nature of uncertainty in our model essentially is about the time and investment needed
within each stage.
The investment only inﬂuences the conditional probability of success in every period and
independent of time. In particular, the investment ﬂow does not inﬂuence the value of the
successful realization, R.
As the experimentation process unfolds over time, agent and venture capitalist learn more
about the prospects of the project. Suppose then that for each stage, experimentation is
undertaken for a total of Tn periods, where Tn = T1, T2,...TN denotes the maximum duration
or horizon for the completion of each of the stages n =1 ,2,...N. The ex ante probability of
successful completion of the ﬁrst stage is thus 1 − (1 − λ)T1
. Since the completion of each
earlier stage is required to move on, if there is no success in the nth stage within the horizon
of Tn periods, it means that the entire project is abandoned. The ex ante probability that the
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5We next determine the evolution of the posterior beliefs. Denote by pn
t the jointly held belief
that the project will eventually be a success, held in the tth period of the nth stage based on
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Thus, as long as the entrepreneur continues to invest in any given stage, the belief about
the project’s success is gradually diminishing as a result of the shorter number of chances of a
yet successful experiment, Tn − t. However, once stage n is successfully completed, the belief
discontinuously jumps to a higher level. We get a stochastic seesaw pattern of the evolution
of the following belief: the belief slopes down within each stage but has an upwards trend
overall, representing the improvement in beliefs as the projects nears completion of the ﬁnal
stage. The timing of the jumps are stochastic due to the uncertain nature of each stage. (See
Figure 1).
2.2. Moral Hazard and Financing
Entrepreneur and venture capitalists have initially the same assessment about the likelihood of
success, which is given by the prior belief p1
0. The funds are supplied by the venture capitalist,
but they can only be allocated by the agent to generate the desired success R. The venture
capitalist, however, cannot observe whether the funds are correctly applied to the experiment,
and thus a moral hazard problem arises between ﬁnancier and entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
c a ni nf a c t“ s h i r k ”a n dd e c i d et od i v e r tt h ec a p i t a lﬂow to her private ends, gaining a utility
of cλ in the process.4 In contrast, the successful completion of any stage n =1 ,...,N − 1 is
observable and veriﬁable.
The venture capitalist proposes a contract to the entrepreneur which can be contingent
on time, the capital provided by the investor, as well as on new agreements between the two
parties. Then the entrepreneur accepts or rejects the proposal, implying that the venture
capitalist captures the entire surplus of the project.5 Because of the moral hazard problem of
the ﬁnancing, however, the contract cannot be made contingent on the use of the funds. The
4An equivalent interpretation of the moral hazard problem is that running the experiments requires eﬀort,
which is costly for the agent. By reducing the eﬀort, the agent also reduces the probability of success and hence
the eﬃciency of the employed capital.
5The opposite assumption about the distribution of bargaining power is made in Bergemann and Hege (1998)
and (2002).
6design of the contract has to ensure that incentive compatibility and individual participation
constraints are satisﬁed.
We will argue below that stage contracts of the following form are the optimal arrangements
in this environment. The venture capitalist proposes such a stage contract at the entry into
each new stage n. The contract speciﬁes the maximal stage duration Tn to complete the stage
n, and a dynamic schedule of monetary reward payments sn
t that the agent receives in the
event of meeting the benchmark of the nth stage after t periods.
The contract contains provisions eﬀectively inhibiting the continuation of the project once
Tn periods have lapsed; the project will have to be irrevocably abandoned. In other words, we
assume that the venture capitalist can choose Tn and commit to the following horizon.6
3. A Single Stage
We prepare the ground by looking at the simple case where there is just a single possible stage,
N =1 . This case is a version of the model analyzed in our earlier papers (Bergemann and
Hege (1998)and (2002), where details for the expression of this Section can be obtained) with
as i m p l i ﬁed belief process, but with two important diﬀerences: ﬁrst, the venture capitalist
has the bargaining power; and second, the number of periods is determined by the venture
capitalist’s proﬁt maximization objective rather than eﬃciency.
Value of the Venture. We denote by Vt(T) the value of the project in stage t if the total
horizon comprises T periods. Suppose the optimal number of ﬁnancing periods is ﬁxed at T
w h i c hw ea s s u m ef o rn o w( a n ds h o wl a t e r )t ob eﬁnite. Note that in the ﬁrst best, T = ∞ since
we have assumed that λR − cλ ≥ 0. If the project should be funded once, it should receive
funds indeﬁnitely since the problem is stationary. Hence we obtain the value of the venture in
the terminal period T as VT(T)=λR−cλ, and in earlier periods recursively via the following
dynamic programming equation:
Vt(T)= m a x
it∈{0,λ}
½






where it ∈ {0,λ} is the venture capitalist’s allocation of funds. Clearly, the linear form of the
value function (3.1) indicates that it is optimal to invest at the level of cλ for as long as t ≤ T.
We consider the transition to the continuous time limit of our model, as in Bergemann and
Hege (2002), from where details can be gleaned. Let ∆ denote the time elapsed between two
6See Bergemann and Hege (2002) for an extensive discussion of renegotiation in this game.
7periods t and t +1 . With this notation, (3.1) can be rewritten as:




Letting ∆ → 0 and solving yields the continuous-time expression of the project’s value function




(R − c)λ (3.2)
The value function V0(T) oﬀers an intuitive explanation. cλ is invested in each period,
and the prize R is obtained with probability λ, conditional on no earlier discovery. The value
of the project is then discounted with an eﬀective factor of r + λ, compounding pure time,
discounting r and the probability of success λ in each period. Total project uncertainty is then
captured by the ﬁrst term in (3.2), which can be understood as a stochastic discount factor
over T period, discounting the uncertain arrival time of the risky success.
Incentive Contracts. Since successful completion of the project is the only veriﬁable ev-
idence on the agent’s eﬀort, the incentives provided to the entrepreneur should maximally
discriminate with respect to the signal R. With the wealth constraint of the entrepreneur,
the optimal contract is a share contract, where the agent receives a positive reward st ≥ 0 if
the project was a success and nothing otherwise. is The minimal reward st of the entrepre-
neur is chosen so that she truthfully carries out the proposed investment policy. We consider
only optimal share contracts from the venture capitalist’s point of view, with full scope for
intertemporal transfers, i.e. long-term contracts.
We start from the incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur in the last period,
which immediately leads to the last period requirement on the entrepreneur’s reward, λsT ≥ cλ,
and hence an expected value to the entrepreneur of ET(T)=cλ. Moving backwards in time,











where st is the minimum cash reward satisfying the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint.7
W en o t i c et h ei n t e r t e m p o r a ls t r u c t u r eo ft h ep r o b l e m .T h ei n c e n t i v e st od i v e r tf o rt h ea g e n t








8arise (i) via a contemporaneous eﬀect, namely the utility from the diverted funds cλ,a n d(ii)
via the dynamic eﬀect that the contract continuation into the next period becomes more likely.
The solution st of the minimization problem (3.3) delivers the expected value Et(T) the
entrepreneur receives for a given funding policy, taking in to account the sequence of incentive
constraints. Taking again limits as ∆ → 0, the value function Et(T) of the entrepreneur and





The compensation st ensures that the entrepreneur employs the capital in every period
towards the discovery process. The behavior of the shares st over time is thus determined
by an underlying option problem. The value of this particular option is determined as any
regular option by the volatility of the underlying state variable (represented by the conditional
probability λ) and the maturity (the remaining length of the funding, T − t). Therefore,
two forces help to realign the interest of the entrepreneur with the ones of the investor: (i)
suﬃciently strong discounting and (ii) shares are decreasing over time and hence penalize late
discovery.
Optimal Stopping. As the market for venture capital is competitive, in equilibrium the
net value of the project will belong entirely to the venture capitalist. Prior to stopping the
project, the venture capitalist will decide to fully fund the project; therefore, the decision on
the optimal stopping time T suﬃciently summarizes the venture capitalist’s investment policy.
The venture capitalist’s initial problem is then given by:
max
{T,(st)}
{Vt(T) − Et(T)} (3.5)
We have already characterized the optimal function of rewards st in (3.4). To determine
the optimum stopping time T, we investigate the maximum of (3.5) and obtain the following






Thus, unlike the ﬁrst best solution, which always would be to choose T = ∞, the presence of
agency costs implies a reduction in the horizon that maximizes the venture capitalist’s proﬁts.
4. Funding without Benchmarks
We ﬁrst consider the case where the venture capitalist has no benchmarking technology, i.e.
no capacity to observe or verify the completion of earlier stages. Only the realization of the
9last stage remains veriﬁable. Completion of all stages is indispensable for the project to create
value, namely the prize R. Therefore, in this case, the venture capitalist can budget only for
a single investment stage of total length T. For simplicity, we restrict this discussion to the
case where there are just two stages, with N =2 ,w h i c hi ss u ﬃcient to analyze the structure








This assumption guarantees that the venture capitalist is willing to oﬀer a share sT that is
suﬃcient to ensure the entrepreneur’s incentives in period T − 1, even if the entrepreneur has
not yet completed the ﬁrst benchmark.
4.1. Value of the Venture
Let us then consider the value of the ﬁrm in this problem. Assume that the entrepreneur has
successfully completed the ﬁrst stage. We use the superscript i ∈ {1,2} for the value functions
to indicate that the entrepreneur knows to be in stage i =1 ,2. If the entrepreneur knows
to be in the second stage, the value of the venture is obtained recursively by the dynamic
programming equation:
V 2
t (T)=m a x
it
½







where it ∈ {0,λ} indicates the funding policy of the venture capitalist. We know that the
entrepreneur may try to complete the second stage for at most T periods, and the ﬁrst stage
for T periods. If the last stage is a failure in all T periods, the ﬁnal prize will be zero. Again,






Similarly, the agent’s value function in the ﬁrst stage is,8
V 1























(R − c)λ (4.4)
8Whether V
2
t (T) or V
1
t (T) i st h et r u ev a l u ei sp r i v a t ek n o w l e d g eo ft h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ,s i n c eh ea l o n eo b s e r v e s
the ﬁrst benchmark.
10In this expression, the second term in the square bracket indicates the increasing loss from
the following unconditional temporal limit: the later is the entry t into the second stage, the
shorter will be the remaining time T − t to successfully complete this ﬁnal round. The ﬁrst
two terms in expression (4.4) represent the stochastic discounting of the ﬁnal value, which
occurs over the two stages. Finally, the last term Te−(r+λ)T expresses loss from suboptimal
exploitation of second stage.
4.2. Information Rent and Optimal Stopping
We turn then to the entrepreneur’s rent in this case. The optimal continuation contract at the
entry into the last stage is exactly as the contract would be for a single stage problem with a






Since only the entrepreneur observes whether the ﬁrst benchmark has been attained or not,
asymmetric information between venture capitalist and entrepreneur emerges as the project is
undertaken - the entrepreneur knows whether he is of “type 1” - still trying to meet the ﬁrst
benchmark - or already of “type 2” - i.e., advanced to the second stage -, while the venture
capitalist must design a contract that is incentive-compatible for one or for both types. Clearly,
the project cannot succeed if it is not incentive compatible at least initially for the type 1, and
later for type 2. It is intuitive that, as the funding horizon T d r a w st oac l o s e ,i ti se a s i e rt o
ensure the incentives of type 2 than of type 1, who is in a more remote position, i.e. still two
benchmarks away from ﬁnal success. The critical question is, therefore, whether the optimal
contract will provide incentives for both types throughout, or whether it will abandon the type
1 entrepreneur at some point and only provide incentives to the more advanced type 2.
We will show in the Appendix that under assumption (4.1), the lower bound of the en-
trepreneur’s value in (4.5) represents at the same time the value function of the agent in the
optimal incentive-compatible contract, that provides incentive compatibility for both types for
the longest time possible, namely for the ﬁrst T −1 periods. Since maximal incentive compat-
ibility can be ensured with a contract that costs no more than the lower bound (4.5) of the
entrepreneur’s value, this contract must be optimal.
Taking the diﬀerence of expressions (4.4) and (4.5) yields the venture capitalist’s objective
function as:
V 1









(R − c)λ − cλ
1 − e−rT
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There are then two cases to be considered: either the project has a positive value for the
venture capitalist and the optimal project horizon corresponds to the larger solution of (4.6)
which is the only candidate for a maximum. Or, if the project is “poor”, i.e. R is small relative
to c, it may be optimal to choose T =0 .
5. Stage Financing
In this Section, we assume that the venture capitalist is able to observe and verify the comple-
tion of the ﬁrst stage. The optimal contract is then a succession of stage ﬁnancing contracts:
only after successful completion of the ﬁrst stage will the contract for the second stage be
drafted. Contingent stopping, after failure in the ﬁrst stage, is a valuable, real option in this
case (as we will show), ensuring that continuing ﬁnance is only taking place if there is success
in the preceding stage.
5.1. Value of the Venture and Agency
Proceeding again in a backwards fashion from the last stage, the value of the venture in the
last stage, V N
t (TN), corresponds exactly to the value in the single stage problem expressed in,
where the optimal funding horizon in the stage N will now be denoted as TN.
Consider then the value function in the penultimate stage. This value is a function of both
the current duration TN−1 and the last stage duration TN. To keep the notation short, let
Tn =( Tn, Tn+1,...TN) denote the vector of the durations of the remaining stages in stage n.
The value function is recursively determined as
V N−1



























(R − c)λ − c
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λ,
12where the last equation is obtained after using the expression for the last stage derived in



















Clearly, as we construct recursively the value function of the multi-stage problem V
(n)
0 (Tn,...,TN),
we ﬁnd that the value function exhibits the following time pattern: with the completion of one
stage, synonymous to entry into the next stage, the value experiences a discontinuous jump
upwards; but within each stage, as the time runs towards the horizon set for its completion,
the value is decreasing. Thus, the value function follows a stochastic seesaw pattern with an
upwards drift just as the belief function does.
We turn then to the entrepreneur’s rent at entry into the last stage. The optimal continua-
tion contract at the (stochastic) entry point into the last stage is exactly as the contract would




r , where TN is the funding horizon of the last stage. In fact, this rent
is independent of the exact time when the last stage is reached. Thus, since the problem at
the beginning of the last period is isomorphic to the single stage problem investigated above,
the venture capitalist’s preferred solution will be the same. The venture capitalist designs this
contract to maximize V N
0 (TN)−EN
0 (TN), and the solution will be as in (3.6), TN = −1
λ ln c
R−c.
The situation becomes more complicated though as we move backwards in time. Consider
the penultimate stage. Since the successful completion of this stage is veriﬁable, the agent can
be paid a reward upon meeting the benchmark of this stage, and this reward can be conditional
on the timing of the success. We will denote this time-contingent reward by sN−1
t , where t is
the period within the second to last stage where the agent meets the benchmark. Moreover,
the agent knows that success carries with it the implicit compensation of moving on to the
last stage, with its information rent EN
0 (TN). This information rent has an incentive eﬀect
in the second to last period. As it turns out, the size of this incentive eﬀect, relative to the
required incentive payment schedule within the stage, leads to an important distinction in the
construction of the agent’s value function.
5.2. Always Immediate Incentives
If TN−1 periods have passed without discovery, the project is liquidated, and the agent gets
nothing, i.e. EN−1
TN−1+∆(TN−1)=0 . Therefore, and considering again the continuous-time case









In fact, incentive compatibility requires that this expected value be larger than cλ,w h i c h
is the entrepreneur’s option value from shirking. Hence if λEN
0 (TN) <c λ,t h e nsN−1
TN−1 > 0 is
required. This condition can be rewritten as:
λ < ˆ λ ≡
r
1 − erTN (5.5)
Note that λ > ˆ λ will generally hold if (i) λ >rand if (ii) TN is large enough. In essence,
the promise of the minimum of future information rents suﬃces by itself to guarantee incentive
compatibility, and further contemporaneous incentives are not needed.
We consider then ﬁrst the case where λ < ˆ λ, since this case is easier to analyze, leaving the
complementary case to the next subsection. With this condition, a positive reward payment
is needed whenever the agent successfully completes one of the stages. We denote by sn
t > 0
the minimum reward required upon completion of the nth stage in period t of stage n.T h e
following simple observation is important to understand the structure of feasible contracts if
λ < ˆ λ:
Lemma 1. Feasible stage ﬁnancing contracts require that the agent be paid with an immediate
cash reward of at least sn
t .
Proof: See Appendix.
In particular, it is not suﬃcient to pay the agent with equity or other contingent claims
on R, that can only be cashed in if all stages are successfully completed. Immediacy of
incentive rewards is the key observation here, and the reason for this immediacy is that a hold-
up problem would arise otherwise: if the payments to the agent were contingent on achieving
further benchmarks, they would have incentive eﬀect in the next stage. As a result, the investor
would cut back the rewards oﬀered ex post, at entry into the subsequent stage. Anticipating
this reduction ex ante, the agent would ﬁnd it more attractive to shirk rather than to work.
The investor needs to commit to the level of incentive payments required ex ante, and pledging
immediate rewards that are not contingent on further achievements are the obvious way to do
it.
This observation is interesting because in principle, one would expect that the highest
power of incentives could be attained by making all rewards contingent on completion of the
14ﬁnal benchmark: in our nested model, the last stage has the highest information value on
eﬀort, since its completion means that the agent has truthfully invested in all prior stages.
By contrast, success in any earlier stage gives information regarding the agent’s eﬀort only up
to that benchmark. Although, incentives contingent on meeting the ﬁnal benchmark appear
to be the cheapest device for the investor, since actual reward payments will have to be paid
only if the entire project is successful. Indeed, Gavious and Elitzur (2001) obtain a result that
incentives should be based on the accomplishing of the last benchmark in a diﬀerent model of
stage ﬁnancing, which shares with our model the feature that stages are nested.9
T h ef a c tt h a tw eo b t a i nad i ﬀerent result here clearly points to a trade-oﬀ in our model, a
trade-oﬀ between the advantage high-powered incentives (which pleads in favor of postponing
compensation) and the need to be time-consistent. An important practical implication of our
immediacy result is:
Corollary 1. Contracts can guarantee immediate incentives by providing all the funding needs
for any stage up-front.
Up-front ﬁnancing in the current stage, and hence the build-up of potentially important
cash reserves, is not the only way to achieve the required immediate rewards; other forms are
possible as well. But it is the way that is frequently observed in practice. Stage ﬁnancing typ-
ically implies that cash is raised discontinuously, at the beginning of each stage, while the cash
outﬂow from the venture is often much smoother. Our analysis interprets this discontinuous
evolution in the venture’s cash position as a deliberate choice to guarantee the agent’s required
information rents. In our view, the cash paid up-front is cash at the discretion of the agent,
and this discretion protects the agent against any possible hold-up by the investor. Notice that
a lower bound of the entrepreneurs’ information rent at any given moment is the remaining
stream of cash in-ﬂows up to the maximum horizon of the current stage; and any excess cash
that the entrepreneur holds in the current stage, after reaching the benchmark early, will be
used in the subsequent stage since the new can easily provide the right incentives for mutual
advantage.
We will continue with the analysis of the optimal contract in the case of λ < ˆ λ,a n di n
particular determine the optimal horizon Tn in a typical stage n. Starting from condition (5.4)
in period Tn and moving backwards in time, suppose the agent accomplishes the benchmark of
9The logic of making compensation contingent on the most informative output is also reminiscent of Innes
(1990) moral hazard model.
15this stage in period t<Tn. When discovery is made, the entrepreneur will get a future rent that
is at least equal to En+1
0 (Tn+1,Tn+2,...), and this regardless of the period in which discovery
occurs. We assume that immediate incentives are always needed, i.e. sn
t > 0 is necessary
throughout to satisfy this incentive constraint. Taking this into account, the continuous time










t (Tn) ≥ cλ + En
t (Tn) (5.6)
Since sn






As we would expect, the entrepreneur’s rent is monotonically decreasing within the ﬁrst
stage, i.e. En
t (Tn) >E n
τ (Tn) for τ >t .
We can then determine the optimal budgeting decision in this case. The investor recursively
solves the contract design problem and chooses the optimal funding horizon Tn by maximizing
her net value V n
0 (Tn) − En
0(Tn). Substituting and solving the maximization problem (7.7)
yields the following results:
Proposition 1. Suppose immediate rewards are needed in every period, i.e. sn
t > 0 for all n








0 (Tn+1) − c
!
(5.8)
The optimal horizon Tn is strictly increasing in n.
Proof: See Appendix.
5.3. Implicit Incentives
We turn now to the case where λ > ˆ λ. Consider the entrepreneur’s incentives in the last period
of the penultimate stage. If the benchmark is accomplished, the entrepreneur will get a future















16But in the case λ > ˆ λ, we know the entrepreneur’s implicit incentives given by the prospect of








Taking this into account, clearly incentive compatibility will be satisﬁed in the last period of











t (TN−1) ≥ cλ + EN−1
t (TN−1) (5.9)
Inequality (5.9) reveals that sN−1










Let us consider any general funding stage n. Now, as we would expect, the entrepreneur’s
rent is monotonically decreasing within each stage, i.e. En
t (Tn) >E n
τ (Tn) for τ >t .T os e e
this, note that En
t (Tn) ≤ cλ
r for all t ∈ [0,Tn], i.e. the agent’s rent will never exceed the value
of a perpetual stream of funding of cλ (since this is the maximum rent she can divert). Thus,
there will be at most a single transition period where inequality (5.10) switches from being
violated (and hence sn
t > 0 for all periods prior to the transition period) to being satisﬁed
(hence sn
t =0 ). We denote this transition period by ˆ tn.T h a ti s ,ˆ tn is the ﬁrst period where
implicit incentives are wholly suﬃcient to guarantee incentive compatibility. We can then












0 (Tn+1) if t ≥ ˆ tn
cλ1−e−r(ˆ tn−t)






0 (Tn+1) if t<ˆ tn
(5.11)
An investigation of the investor’s problem allows us to establish the following key insight:
Proposition 2. The optimal stopping time Tn will be such that the reward function s
(n)
t is
initially strictly positive, for an initial interval of t ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
17The observation that the rewards sn
t are initially strictly positive is equivalent to saying
that the transition point ˆ tn in equation (5.12) is strictly positive. This observation allows us
to write the agent’s value, at entry into stage n,a s :
En
0(Tn)=cλ










In other words, the experimentation will be long enough for the agent initially to receive
enough contingent compensation via information rents in future stages. As time is running out
in the current stage, however, the option value that the agent obtains by deviating diminishes,
and with it the need to compensate for the loss in this value. In other words, once ˆ t1 is
passed, the experimentation in the current stage comes essentially free for the investor, since
the implicit promise of future rents is suﬃcient; but that second phase cannot be prolonged
without increasing the ﬁrst, costly phase.
Note that the distance Tn−ˆ tn is determined in a recursive fashion, via condition of (5.10),
and is therefore independent of Tn. We adopt the notation In ≡ Tn − ˆ tn for the duration of
this second phase. The agent’s value function En follows again the, by now familiar stochastic
seesaw pattern, decreasing within each stage and upwards jumping at the entry into a new
stage (see Figure 2). After substituting (5.2) and (5.12) and transiting to continuous time, the
investor’s problem of maximizing V n
0 (Tn) − En
0(Tn) can be analyzed. We ﬁnd:
Proposition 3. (i) Suppose λ > ˆ λ. Then there is at least one stage, namely the penultimate
stage, where implicit incentives are eventually suﬃcient.
(ii) In a stage where implicit incentives are eventually suﬃcient, the optimal total horizon
Tn is given by:
























(iii) In is increasing in n,a n dIn > 0 in the ﬁnal stages of the project (except for the last
stage), but not necessarily in the early stages. If In > 0 in stage n, then the funding horizon
Tn is strictly larger compared with the same stage with only immediate incentives (λ < ˆ λ).
Proof: See Appendix.
18The important insight of this analysis is that the availability of implicit incentives will
indeed increase the funding horizon. Since the funding horizon is always too short compared
to the ﬁrst-best (where it is inﬁnite), and since the funding horizon is in principle increasing
as more stages are completed and the overall value of the project increases, this is a welcome
mechanism to overcome agency-driven capital budgeting constraints. Recall that the funding
horizon in the last stage TN, will be the same with immediate or implicit incentives. Thus, a
longer horizon in earlier stages is unambiguously good news. Intuitively, this increase in the
funding horizon is due to the fact that part of the compensation in the current stage need not
be provided contemporaneously. It is implied by the continuation values, making an extension
of the current round less costly in terms of information rents. This eﬀect may be so strong
that the total funding horizon is not monotonically increasing from one stage to the next.
It is also intuitive why In is increasing over time. Since the agent’s value must be strictly
increasing from stage to stage (otherwise the incentive constraint would be violated), the
potential power of implicit incentives is also increasing over time. Thus, frequently implicit
incentives will be prevalent in the last stages of a project (while still requiring immediate cash
incentives in the early periods of each stage, according to Lemma 2). But in the early stages,
it is more likely that the compensation must rely on immediate cash incentives in every period.
5.4. Synopsis
We can summarize our observations as follows: if the investor cannot use benchmarks, then
the capital budget allocated to the project will be severely curtailed. The information rent has
to be compounded over the entire horizon. Moreover, the experimentation horizon is deﬁned
for the project as a whole, and not ﬁne-tuned to every stage. This will often lead to unwanted
distortions in time allocations between various stages. For example, if most of the horizon has
elapsed but the agent did not yet succeed in meeting the ﬁrst benchmark, he will nevertheless
continue to run the experiments for the ﬁrst stage. The problem of continuing for too long
in the ﬁrst stage is made worse by the fact that the horizon for the subsequent stages will
automatically be shortened, since the continuation budget becomes history-dependent.
Benchmarking introduces a sequential real option to abandon. In the context of our dy-
namic agency model, the option value of these imbedded real options is comprised of the
following four eﬀects:
First, since the project is abandoned once a benchmark is not met within its pre-deﬁned
horizon, the information rent of the agent is dramatically reduced. In the simplest and perhaps
19most instructive case (immediate incentives), the compounding period of the information rent
is shortened to the maximal duration of a single stage, rather than the maximal duration of
t h ee n t i r ep r o j e c t .
Second, benchmarking makes it possible to deﬁne optimal and intertemporally consistent
research budgets (research horizons) for every single stage. An important advantage is that
these budgets will be independent of the history of delays and cost overruns in past ﬁnancing
rounds.
Third, the optimal research horizon increases from one stage to the next. Early stages
should stop relatively rapidly because the chance for an overall success is remote. As more
benchmarks are realized, the value of the project increases, and it becomes rational to persevere
for longer. This ﬁnding explains that the ﬁrst steps in a research project are the riskiest (and
deserve the application of a higher risk-adjusted discount rate). Importantly, this decreasing
trend in research risk is explained as an endogenous decision in a dynamic model, and not by
technological characteristics. We would obtain a similar result if, say, λ was larger in early
stages, making them a priori more likely to succeed.
A fourth, and more subtle, option value of benchmarking is that it permits the use of
implicit incentives comprised by the relational promise of future contingent ﬁnancing rounds
if earlier rounds are successfully completed. The promise of future information rents serves as
a powerful incentive device in earlier stages, making the extension of the funding horizon in
earlier stages cheaper. The power of implicit incentives will notably be strong if the project’s
success probability is high relative to the time discount eﬀect (λ >r ). This is a welcome eﬀect
from a social point of view since the presence of agency costs means that all research horizons
are too short when compared with the ﬁrst best. The interdependence between the optimal
sequencing of research horizons and the implicit incentive eﬀect is perhaps the most intriguing
ﬁnding of our analysis.
The beneﬁts of benchmarking are reﬂected in the following comparative ﬁndings on the
project duration:
Proposition 4. (i) The total research horizon over all stages will always be strictly larger if
stage ﬁnancing is used compared with funding without benchmarking.
(ii) If the project is relatively poor, R
c < 1+e, then the last stage of stage ﬁnancing alone
will have a longer funding horizon than the entire horizon if there is no benchmarking.
Proof: See Appendix.
20Thus, for a given research budget amounting to the total expected outlays at the beginning
(real investments and compensations for the agent), the research horizon and the success
probability will be the larger, the better deﬁned, and the better monitored the intermediate
benchmarks are. Its initial value and return to investors, as well as the value appreciation of
the portfolio company from one ﬁnancing round to the next, should be increasing functions of
the benchmarking intensity.
6. Robustness and Conclusion
T h i sp a p e ri n v e s t i g a t e dt h ep r o v i s i o no fv e n t u r ec a p i t a li nar e s e a r c hv e n t u r ew i t hs e q u e n t i a l
development stages. The binary outcome of each stage of the project is uncertain, and a steady
investment ﬂow is needed to safeguard the chances for success in each stage. The entrepreneur
controls the application of the funds which are provided by the venture capitalist.
The optimal compensation of the entrepreneur is akin to a nested sequence of option con-
tracts. The options express the value of the intertemporal incentive constraint, and the rela-
tional promise of future options works to alleviate the pressure to provide contemporaneous
performance-related cash incentives.
A natural extension is to consider what happens if there are intermediate values of the
project, that is if upon realization of the intermediate benchmark n,ap o s i t i v ev a l u eRn is
realized if the project is unsuccessful in the next stage and hence abandoned after n stages. In
this case, the combined result of the current and all previous intermediate stages, worth Rn,
will be sold to outsiders for a cash payment of Rn a tt h et i m eo ft h es a l e . T h ep r o j e c tw i l l
then be irreversibly terminated, since neither the incumbent entrepreneur nor the acquiring
outsiders will have a possibility to complete the missing stages. We assume of course that the
successive intermediate values of the project satisfy, R1 <R 2 < .... < RN−1 <R N,a n dt h a t
in a perfect world, every stage until the ﬁnal stage N is worthwhile undertaking.
It is easy to see that this generalization has no impact on our ﬁnding whatsoever: As argued
in Section 5, in principle the optimal incentive instrument would exploit the highest incentive
power possible and grant a rent to the agent only upon completion of the last stage. But this
leads frequently to a time consistency conﬂict between the ex ante level of required investments,
and immediate cash compensations are needed to overcome the hold-up problem. Nothing
changes in the structure of the optimal incanting contracts, when intermediate results are
introduced. The only eﬀect is in the investor’s objective function, and indeed the appreciation
of the values V n from one stage to the next may be substantially reduced, and with it the
21increase in the optimal funding horizons form one stage to the next.
The paper focuses on the ﬁnancing of venture projects, but the problem analyzed here is
present in the ﬁnancing of R&D in general. We show that the optimal funding horizon or
research intensity in each of the sequential stages are derived endogenously, and identify the
key determinants, namely future project risks and information rents and their interaction in
the current stage. The present work contributes to the understanding of how agency costs and
optimal research policy interact.
227. Appendix
Derivation of Equation (4.4): In discrete time, the value function can be written as follows
(where we use the notation δ = 1
1+r for the discount factor):
V 1
0 (T)=δλV 2
1 (T)+δ(1 − λ)V 1
1 (T)=δλ
1 − δT−1(1 − λ)T−1
1 − δ(1 − λ)
(R − c)λ +
δ(1 − λ)
"
1 − δT−2(1 − λ)T−2
1 − δ(1 − λ)
+ δ(1 − λ)
1 − δT−3(1 − λ)T−3






1 − δ(1 − λ)
"
1 − δT−1(1 − λ)T−1
1 − δ(1 − λ)
− TδT−1(1 − λ)T−1
#
(R − c)λ
For the transition to continuous time, we introduce again the notation ∆, hence replace
δ = 1
1+r by 1
1+∆r and λ by ∆λ. Taking the limit as ∆ → 0, (4.4) obtains.
Derivation of Equation (4.5): We develop the argument in discrete time. We denote by
Ei
t the entrepreneur’s value function in t if he is of type i =1 ,2, and drop the argument T
for simplicity. Suppose the entrepreneur is of type 1 in period T − 1, i.e. he still has not
completed the ﬁrst stage. To ensure incentive compatibility for the last two periods, the last
period reward sT must at least satisfy
E1
T−1 = δλ2sT + δ(1 − λ)cλ ≥ cλ(1 + δ) (7.1)
Note that the venture capitalist is willing to oﬀer this compensation since, from assumption
(4.1), the minimum reward sT satisfying (7.1) is such that R − c>s T,s ot h en e te x p e c t e d
proﬁt of the venture capitalist is positive. The value function of the type 1 entrepreneur in
period t ≤ T − 1 can also recursively be expressed as:
E1
t = δλE2
t+1 + δ(1 − λ)E1
t+1 ≥ cλ + δE1
t+1,( 7 . 2 )
where E1
T = cλ is the value that a type 1 entrepreneur receives in the last period (only diverting







is required, and the sequence st,s t+1 must be chosen so as to satisfy (7.3). Note also that




23satisﬁes this condition (7.3) in period T −1 and, hence, also (7.1) with equality. Consider then
incentive compatibility for type 2 which requires that
E2
t = λst + δ(1 − λ)E2
t+1 ≥ cλ + δE2
t+1 ⇔ st ≥ c + δE2
t+1 . (7.5)
Using (7.4) and (7.3), it is possible to construct recursively a sequence of rewards sT−1,s T−2,...
such that the incentive compatibility constraints (7.2) and (7.5) for types 1 and 2 hold with
equality, everywhere for t ≤ T −1 and for type 2 at t = T. Then, by substituting (7.1) (holding







and since (7.6) corresponds to the lower bound (4.5) and guarantees incentive compatibility
for both types in the maximum number of periods, this contract must be optimal.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Suppose that the reward with expected value of sn
t is paid only condi-
tional on termination of the next benchmark n+1 , for example, by paying a cash payment of
ˆ sn+1 = r+λ
1−e−(r+λ)Tn+1sn
t if the benchmark of stage n+1is completed. Recall that En+1
0 (Tn+1)
is the minimum incentive compatible value of the agent upon entry in the subsequent stage.
Suppose that, in the contract signed at entry in stage n +1 , the investor pledges new incen-
tive compatible rewards worth En+1
0 (Tn+1) .B u ts i n c esn
t is paid only conditional on success
at least in the new stage n +1 ,t h i sr e w a r dh a si n c e n t i v ep o w e ri ns t a g en +1as well: the
eﬀective value that the entrepreneur expects when never deviating in the new stage is worth
sn
t + En+1
0 (Tn+1). It follows that the investor can propose another contract for stage n +1 ,
where every success reward is reduced by ˆ sn+1, and yet this contract is incentive-compatible
ex post. Thus, incentive payments worth sn
t + En+1
0 (Tn+1) are required ex ante, but only
En+1
0 (Tn+1) will be oﬀered ex post, showing a contradiction.
Finally note that λ > ˆ λ is the critical condition: this condition ensures that immediate
compensation is required in every period of the last stage, and since En−1 <E n and Tn−1 <Tn,
it follows immediately that the same holds in all prior stages. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :The optimal stopping horizon Tn is obtained by substituting (5.3)
and (5.7) into the optimization problem:
max
Tn V n
0 (Tn) − En
0(Tn) (7.7)
and solving for the ﬁrst-order condition. The fact that Tn is strictly increasing in n is an
immediate consequence of the fact that V n+1
0 >Vn
0 . QED.
24P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : Assume to the contrary that sn
t =0 , implying ˆ tn =0 . Then,














and since V n+1
0 (Tn+1)−En+1
0 (Tn+1) > 0 as a consequence of recursive optimization, there
is no ﬁnite solution Tn of (7.8). But then observe that, as Tn →∞ , the agent can secure a
perpetual rent of cλ simply by always deviating. Thus, incentive compatibility of the contract








Finally, note that En
0(Tn) ≥ cλ
r in (5.12) requires that ˆ tn →∞as well, contradicting our
assumption that ˆ tn =0 . QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: In a stage where In > 0, the investor’s initial problem can be
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Maximizing the objective function (7.10) and solving for Tn gives (5.14). The solution
of In is obtained by solving the equivalent condition for (5.10) for an arbitrary stage n,a n d














0(Tn) must be strictly increasing in n, since otherwise the incentive constraint
could not hold at the beginning of each stage. Inspection of (5.14) shows then that In is




















0 >e −rIn 1 − erIn
r
cλ (7.13)













But then compare the ﬁrst-order condition (7.13) to condition (7.7) in the case of immediate
incentives. Taking into account (7.14) then implies that for the same stage n, with identical
V n+1
0 on the left hand side, the optimal Tn must be larger in the case of implicit incentives
compared with the case of immediate incentives. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Assume that a project with N =2will be stage ﬁnanced, but
contains the following contract provision: the duration of the second stage is a 1:1 decreasing
function of the eﬀective length of the ﬁrst stage. That is, if the duration of stage 2 is T2 when
discovery of the ﬁrst benchmark is immediate at t =0 , then the duration of stage 2 will be
shortened to T2 − τ if the ﬁrst-stage discovery is alone made at τ > 0.
Assume that λ < ˆ λ. The value function of the project is identical to (4.4), and because of



















Comparison of (7.16) and (4.6) clearly shows that the total funding horizon T is larger than
without benchmarking. It is easy to extend this argument to N>2. Moreover, note that the
total funding horizon is weakly larger if λ > ˆ λ, so the result holds a fortiori in this case.
(ii) As for the comparison of the length of the last stage under benchmarking, note that







where T1 is the solution of (3.6). Hence T2 >T 1 iﬀ λT2 > 1 in (4.6). Thus, for λT1 =1 ,
T2 = T1, and from (3.6), λT1 =1implies that c
R−c = 1




e. Hence also λT2e−λT2
= c
R−c < 1
e. Consider then the inequality λT2e−λT2
<
1
e. Rearranging and taking logs,
λT2 > lnλT2 +1
which can only hold if λT2 > 1, hence T2 >T1. QED.
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Figure 1: Evolution of ﬁnal success probability. The success times of intermediate
benchmarks are random.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the entrepreneur’s value function. The success times of intermediate
benchmarks are random.
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